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Abstract
We introduce a model of polarization in networks as a unifying framework for the mea-
surement of polarization that covers a wide range of applications. We consider a sufficiently
general setup for this purpose: node- and edge-weighted, undirected, and connected net-
works. We generalize the axiomatic characterization of Esteban and Ray (1994) and show
that only a particular instance within this class can be used justifiably to measure polariza-
tion of networks.
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1 Introduction
Polarization in a population denotes an intensified disconnect among its groups. The analysis
of the sources and the consequences of polarization depends highly on what is measured and
how, which, in turn, is strictly contingent on the particular context. For instance, while in the
context of American politics polarization is perceived as the division of masses into the cultural
camps of liberals and conservatives, in the context of European multi-party parliaments, it is
seen as the existence of ideologically cohesive and distinct party blocks.1 So even the term
“political polarization” is not indicative of what is being measured and how. Existing literature
reflects this complexity, and there is an abundance of measures without a unified formalism
that applies to comparable contexts.
Although there are substantial differences among existing measures in different fields, one
ubiquitous feature can be identified. Namely, most of the current measures are proposed in
settings with a uni-dimensional scalar attribute on which the polarization is assumed to occur.
However, conflicts in societies are in general related to an irreducibly complex set of attributes.
Most of the empirical base rely on categorical data on various characteristics.2 Dimension-
ality reduction approaches are called for in many instances, because the existing polarization
measures allow for only a uni-dimensional, or at most bi-dimensional domain.3 However, re-
duced dimensions can be questionable for their capacity to represent the actual phenomenon of
interest.4
In this paper, we propose the formalism of network theory for the study of the measurement
of polarization as it delivers the desired generality and spans a large variety of contexts. We fully
characterize a polarization measure within an axiomatic setting that is previously introduced
for distributions on the real line.
Our setup is built on undirected networks in which both nodes and links are weighted.
A node in the network represents a certain — potentially multidimensional — attribute of
individuals in the population. The weight of a node corresponds to the number of individuals
in the population that are characterized by that attribute. The nodes can also represent a
grouping of individuals (such as political party membership, families, companies, etc.), in which
case the weights of the nodes denote the sizes of the groups. The links describe (direct) bilateral
relationships between nodes and the intensity of a relationship is quantified by the weight of
the corresponding link. This setup is quite general and can represent a wide range of settings
in which measuring polarization is an issue of first-order importance. We describe a number of
important examples in the next section. For instance, we show how elite polarization can be
1See Fiorina et al. (2005) and Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010) for the two different contexts.
2Examples include ethnolinguistics as in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008), ethnic power relations as in
Wimmer et al. (2009), and political retweets as in Conover et al. (2011), among others.
3See Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) for a review of studies on the measurement of polarization in American
politics.
4See, for instance, Kam et al. (2017) for a discussion in the context of political competition on policy space.
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modeled within our framework through networks of politicians, parties, or policy space. Mass
polarization, on the other hand, can be modeled through a network of opinions and preferences.
Moreover, we discuss how networks can be used as a natural tool to model multidimensional
distributions with finite support.
The axiomatic approach developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) (henceforth ER) for distri-
butions with finite support on the real line led to the development of measures in several other
domains, such as measures for continuous distributions as in Duclos et al. (2004) and measures
for binary classifications as in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) (henceforth MRQ). Most
of the applications employing measures within this line of work lie in the fields of income in-
equality and social conflicts. ER conceptualize polarization as the aggregate antagonism in a
population. The effective antagonism an individual feels against another individual depends on
how alienated she feels from the other’s group and how identified she feels with her own group.
According to ER, a population in which individuals are identified within groups is polarized if
there is a high level of intra-group homogeneity, a high level of inter-group heterogeneity, and a
small number of large-enough groups. They deliver a characterization of a class of polarization
measures, based on an axiomatization built around distributional properties and not confined
to incomes or wealth, although the main motivations of ER were about income and wealth
distributions.
Following ER, we provide an axiomatic characterization for measures of network polariza-
tion. We argue that networks represent a powerful tool to capture any distribution with a finite
support and a notion of distance. Thus, we believe that the strength of our contribution lies in
the fact that we deliver an axiomatic foundation for a family of measures that are applicable
in a very large set of domains. Furthermore, as any distribution considered in ER or MRQ can
be represented as a network, our work can be seen as a unifying generalization, with ER and
MRQ as special cases.
The class of measures characterized by ER is identified by the range of the values the pa-
rameter α can take, which captures the importance of identification in the effective antagonism.
Our main result shows, quite surprisingly, that this class is thinned down by a unique value,
i.e., α = 1, which guarantees that the three axioms adapted for networks are satisfied (Theorem
1).5 Note that adaptations of these axioms are neither trivial nor straightforward, as networks
allow for a much larger generality in representing discrete distributions than the real line.
Recent literature on the measurement of polarization carried along the restricting assump-
tion that the attributes can be captured by the values of a scalar variable. We take off where
ER leave, and deliver an analysis that does not “sweep a serious dimensionality issue under the
rug” (ER, p. 823). Our approach accommodates a significantly larger variety of settings that
are not confined to scalar attributes, and naturally include the case of the Euclidean distance
on the real line as a special case. This entails a solution to an unresolved issue in this line of
research as a by-product, in that our results point to the choice of an exact value within the
5MRQ also identify α = 1 in their setup, which is a special case of ours. Essentially, they characterize the
class of measures for the complete network with links of weight 1 (an individual either belongs or not to a given
group). Furthermore, their axiomatization is different than ours and ER.
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interval (0, α∗ ' 1.6].6
It is desirable that polarization measures attain their maximum at the symmetric bipolar
distribution. Note that contrary to the real line, in networks there can be any finite number
of nodes with maximal distance between them. We show that any measure within the family
we characterize is maximized when the population is symmetrically distributed among the two
most distant nodes in the network (Proposition 1).
We furthermore show that if we restrict our attention to particular classes of networks,
which may be due to reasonable restrictions in different domains, such as language trees, kin-
ship networks, income distributions, etc., one of the axioms (Axiom 3) can be weakened in a
systematic way to allow for measures that can be applied to the intended classes of networks
(Theorem 2). In one extreme, for instance when we are interested in measuring polarization on
line-networks such as income distributions, our set of axioms and the class of measures reduce
to the ones in ER.
Related literature
It presents an immense challenge to pay a fair tribute to the ever-growing literature on the
measurement of polarization. Here, we will refer to a set of papers in different domains and
discuss a few closely related ones. We mention a few other works in Section 5.
Polarization is studied in social sciences (particularly in economics and political science)
in relation to economic inequality (Esteban et al., 2007; Esteban and Ray, 2012; Zhang and
Kanbur, 2001), social conflict (Desmet et al., 2017; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2008; Østby,
2008), political economy (Aghion et al., 2004; Desmet et al., 2012; Lindqvist and O¨stling, 2010),
international relations (Maoz, 2006b), political ideologies (Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fio-
rina and Abrams, 2008; Lelkes, 2016; Martin and Yurukoglu, 2017; Ozdemir and Ozkes, 2014),
political sentiments (Boxell et al., 2017; Garcia et al., 2015), and social attitudes (DiMaggio
et al., 1996; Lee et al., 2014; McCright and Dunlap, 2011), among others.
We want to emphasize that we are not the first to consider an ER-type approach to the
measurement of polarization in networks. For instance, both Esteban and Ray (1999) and Es-
teban and Ray (2011) explore this issue, among others. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper to provide an axiomatic characterization for measures of polarization in
networks.7 Fowler (2006a,b) and Maoz (2006b) are among the leading examples where network
formalism is proposed for the measurement of polarization, without an axiomatic treatment.8
Finally, Permanyer and D’Ambrosio (2015) characterize polarization measures for categorical
attributes by using identification-alienation framework from ER and a number of specific addi-
tional axioms. They arrive to a different family of measures compared to ours.
The rest of the paper is organized in three core sections (2–4), a concluding section (5), and
an appendix devoted to the proofs. In Section 2 we describe the environment we study, define
6Note that ER propose additional restrictions in that regard by imposing an additional axiom (Axiom 4).
7In Esteban and Ray (1999) and Esteban and Ray (2011) α = 1 is used without formally addressing its
justification.
8The measure Maoz (2006b) uses is developed in the unpublished working paper by Maoz (2006a), and while
inspired by Duclos et al. (2004), it is shown to satisfy an extended and qualitatively different set of properties.
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polarization, and illustrate the applicability of our approach in several settings. In Section 3
we state the axioms and deliver our major results. In Section 4 we discuss the importance of
network structure in terms of polarization and formally illustrate the connection between our
work and previous literature. We conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
In this section we describe our framework for the measurement of polarization in networks
formally. We then discuss several exemplary contexts in which data can be represented as a
network and polarization is of importance.
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a population in which individuals belong to n > 0 mutually exclusive groups of
potentially different sizes.9 For each group i, pii ≥ 0 denotes the number of individuals in group
i. Clearly, when group i is composed of a single individual we have pii = 1. When pii = 0 we
will say that group i is empty. Each vector pi ∈ Rn≥0 describes the distribution of a population
among n groups.
Bilateral relationships between n aforementioned groups are described with an undirected
weighted graph (UWG) g, with the set of nodes equal to the set of groups, denoted N(g) =
N = {1, 2, ..., n}, and the set of undirected links (or edges) E(g) = {{i, j} : {i, j} ∈ N2∧ i 6= j}.
As usual, we denote the edge between nodes i and j in graph g with ij and the weight of that
edge with gij ≥ 0. While we treat weights quite generally, it is useful to think of gij as the direct
distance between two connected nodes i and j – thus a higher gij implies a weaker connection
between i and j. 10 For the remaining part of the paper, to indicate that there is an edge
between nodes i and j in g, we write ij ∈ g instead of {i, j} ∈ E(g). When nodes i and j are
not directly connected, we write ij /∈ g. Moreover, since groups are represented as nodes, we
use words group and node interchangeably.
We restrict our attention to connected graphs, i.e., graphs in which there is a path connecting
any two nodes.11 The distance between nodes i and j in g, denoted with dg(i, j), is measured
using the notion of the shortest path. That is, while there may be different routes one can take
to reach node j starting from node i and moving along the links in g, the distance between i
and j is the length of the shortest path. This notion of distance, also known as the geodesic
distance, is the standard practice in graph theory and the theory of networks (see, for instance,
Newman, 2003; Jackson, 2008).
9A group may be, for instance, a political party, ethnic group, or a set of individuals that share the same
attributes.
10The particular interpretation of weights (gij)i,j∈N depends on the application, as will be apparent in Section
2.2.
11As we consider only connected graphs in this paper, we do not mention this again in the sequel. Our insights
can be extended, in a somewhat ad-hoc manner, to cases when g is unconnected, for instance, by defining the
distance between nodes from different components of g to be equal to the longest path between any two connected
nodes in g.
5
Let Gn denote the set of all UWGs with n nodes, and let {Gn}n∈N denote the family of
all UWGs with any number of nodes. The main object of our analysis is the ordered pair
(g,pi) ∈ Gn×Rn≥0, which represents a weighted (both node-weighted and link-weighted) network.
In the rest of the paper we refer to (g,pi) as a network. We use N to denote the set of all
networks with any number of nodes.
In the special case when pi = 1, (g,pi) coincides with the standard notion of a (link-)
weighted network.12 If additionally gij = 1 whenever ij ∈ g, then (g,pi) is a binary network.
Thus (g,pi) is a fairly general object that can be used to represent any undirected network
we observe, allowing for both node-weights and link-weights. For instance, we show in Section
4 that any discrete distribution studied in Esteban and Ray (1994) or any classification as in
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) can be represented with a network.
A polarization measure is a mapping P : N → R≥0 that assigns to each network (g,pi) ∈
N a non-negative real number. We require polarization measures to satisfy the following
homotheticity property that ensures invariance of the measure with respect to the size of the
population
∑
i∈N(g) pii, as in ER.
Assumption 1 (Homotheticity)
P(g,pi) ≥P(g′,pi′) =⇒ P(g, λpi) ≥P(g′, λpi′) for all (g,pi), (g′,pi′) ∈ N and λ > 0.13
Before turning to the axiomatic analysis, we discuss a few examples in which data can be
represented as a network and measuring of polarization is of interest.
2.2 Polarization in political networks
We consider several networks that arise in politics, each of which encodes a different aspect
of the prevailing political climate. In particular, we consider situations in which collection
of individuals express their preferences over alternatives, natural examples of which include a
parliament voting on bills and an electorate choosing among candidates. We discuss how these
two can be modeled as networks in order to measure elite and mass polarization.14
We start with the case of a parliament with possibly more than two parties. Let there be N ∈
N representatives denoted by R = {1, ..., N} and T ∈ N parties denoted by T = (t1, . . . , tT ).
Suppose there are k ∈ N bills that are sponsored by representatives, either individually or in
groups, which are thereafter voted for approval in the parliament. Let vij ∈ {0, 1} denote the
vote of i for the bill j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} and V = {0, 1}k denote the set of possible vote combinations.
Network of representatives, (g′,pi′), link-weighted.
The set of nodes in graph g′ is R = {1, . . . , N}. For any two representatives i and j, let g′ij ≥ 0
denote the share of bills on which they do not vote in the same way.15 Thus, g′ij stands for the
(inverse of the) strength of their connection, where g′ij = 0 indicates that i and j always vote the
12Alternatively, one can think of (g,pi) as a distribution pi on graph g.
13In what follows, we write P(g,pi) in place of P((g,pi)).
14See Kearney (2019) for a review focusing on networks in the political domain from a general perspective.
15Alternatively, one can model that two representatives are connected (with weight 1) if they vote together for
more than 50% of the bills and not connected otherwise, in which case we would have an unweighted network.
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same way.16 When they never vote the same way on any bill, they are not directly connected,
hence ij /∈ g′. The size of every node i ∈ R is pi′i = 1, thus pi′ = 1, as each node represents a
unique representative. An example of networks as such can be found in Andris et al. (2015).
Network of co-sponsorships (gˆ′, pˆi′), unweighted.
The set of nodes in gˆ′ is R = {1, . . . , N}. gˆ′ij = 1 if i and j co-sponsored al least one bill
together, and ij /∈ gˆ′ otherwise.17 The size of each node i ∈ R is pˆi′i = 1, thus pˆi′ = 1, since
each node represents a unique representative. Fowler (2006a) studies this type of networks.
Network of votes, (g˜′, p˜i′), node-weighted.
The set of nodes in graph g˜′ is V = {v1, . . . , v2k}. Two nodes (vote combinations) vi and vj are
connected, i.e., ij ∈ g˜′, whenever vi and vj differ only in a single coordinate (bill). Each link
in g˜′ has a weight 1. p˜i′i denotes the number of individuals with voting profile vi, and p˜i
′ is the
corresponding distribution. Brams et al. (2007) and Moody and Mucha (2013), among others,
study this type of networks.
Network of parties, (g¯′, p¯i′), node- and link-weighted.
The set of nodes in g¯′ is T = {t1, . . . , tT }. g¯′ij denotes the share of bills on which a majority
of representatives in both parties vote the same way.18 Thus, ij /∈ g¯′ indicates that there is no
bill that is supported (or opposed) by a majority of representatives in both parties. The size
of a node ti ∈ T , p¯i′i, denotes the number of seats of the party i in the parliament.19 See Maoz
and Somer-Topcu (2010) for an analysis on party networks.
Each network we describe above focuses on a different aspect of the political activities in
the parliament. Accordingly, the corresponding measures of polarization provide different, yet
complementary, insights into congressional polarization. For instance, P(g′,pi′) tells us how
polarized the policy positions of representatives based on their vote histories are, regardless of
their party affiliations, whereasP(g¯′, p¯i′) measures the party-level polarization. Also,P(g˜′, p˜i′)
is informative about the polarization with respect to policy space, while P(gˆ′, pˆi′) captures the
polarization among representatives with respect to policy cooperation.
For illustration, let us more closely compare networks (g′,pi′) and (g˜′, p˜i′), which are based
on exactly the same data, i.e., votes on bills. Consider the following example with 3 bills and 8
representatives, where “+” represents approval for a bill and and “−” represents disapproval.
R1−3 R4 R5−6 R7 R8
I + − − + +
II − + + − +
III − − + + +
Figure 1a below shows the corresponding network of representatives, whereas Figure 1b
16The fact that g′ij = 0 does not indicate that link between i and j does not exist, but that the distance between
i and j is 0.
17Alternatively, gˆ′ij may reflect how many bills i and j co-sponsored together, in which case, we would have a
link-weighted network.
18g¯′ij captures the ideological distance i.e., the extent the policies of two parties overlap, which can be measured
in different ways. Maoz and Somer-Topcu (2010) take, for instance, the similarities in party manifestos.
19Alternatively, p¯i′ can be taken as 1, disregarding party sizes and focusing on closeness among parties, in
which case we would have a link-weighted network.
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shows the corresponding network of votes.20 Since the two networks describe two different set
of relations in the legislation, we may expect that the measured level of polarization differs
between them. Nevertheless, any polarization measure in our framework is applicable to both
cases. To obtain a deeper insight, for instance, one can also compare polarization of networks
representing different types of relationships with a suitable normalization e.g., by dividing the
polarization index with the maximal value it can attain.
R1 R2
R3
R4
R5R6
R7
R8
0 : 1 : 2 :
(a) Network of representatives.
Nodes denote representatives and
two nodes are not connected if they
do not agree on any issue. The
thickness of edges indicate weights.
000
100
010
001
011
111
110
101
1
1
1
2
3
(b) Network of votes. The nodes rep-
resent all possible vote combinations
e.g., 100 represents the approval of
only first bill.
Figure 1: Two possible network representations of the same profile of votes of representatives.
We next turn to the case of mass polarization. Our example is concerned with an elec-
torate choosing among candidates for an office (or individuals expressing preferences over al-
ternatives such as remain, soft-Brexit, and hard-Brexit). Let there be a set of alternatives
X = {x1, . . . , xm} and each individual i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be endowed with a preference Pi ⊆ X ×X
that is a linear order, i.e., a complete, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on X. Let
L denote the set of all preferences over X and L n be the set of profile of preferences.
Network of preferences, (g′′,pi′′). The set of nodes is L = (p1, . . . , pm!). Two nodes
pi and pj are connected with g
′′
ij = 1, whenever pi can be obtained from pj by switching only
one binary preference, i.e., the Kemeny distance between pi and pj is 1 (Kemeny, 1959).
21 We
denote with pi′′i the number of individuals with preference pi, and with pi
′′ the corresponding
distribution. See Cervone et al. (2012) for a study on preference networks.22
20Common feature of networks (g′,pi′) and (g˜′, p˜i′) is a type of “structural regularity.” Graph g′ leads to a
complete network structure in the sense that each node is connected to any other node, even though there is
a substantial heterogeneity across weights of the links. Graph g˜′ has a lattice structure. This is by no means
necessary for our approach, which is applicable to connected networks with arbitrary structure. For instance, as
in Andris et al. (2015), two representatives can be connected if they vote the same way sufficiently many times,
then the g′ will not have the complete graph structure. Co-sponsorship networks such as (gˆ′, pˆi′) have, in general,
quite irregular structures, as in Fowler (2006b).
21A network of preferences can be represented as a special network of votes, in which each bill represents a
pairwise comparison of alternatives and transitivity is imposed.
22Often without explicitly using the language of networks, graph theoretical representations of preferences
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For an illustration, let {a, b, c} be the set of alternatives and consider the following preference
profile with 11 individuals.
2 3 2 4
a b c c
b a a b
c c b a
This profile of preferences can be represented with a network as depicted as in Figure 2.
abc
acb cab
bac bca
cba2
2
3
4
Figure 2: A distribution over a preference network with 3 alternatives and 11 individuals.
While we focused on examples of networks from the political domain, our approach can nat-
urally be applied in a much wider range of applications, including those that are not commonly
studied using networks. For instance, our setting can be adopted to study multidimensional
polarization in any distribution with a discrete support. To see how, take the example of po-
larization in a society with respect to income and education (both measured on some discrete,
increasing scale). The set of all pairs of income (ι) and education () levels defines the set of
nodes in the network. Two nodes x = (xι, x) and y = (yι, y) are connected, with link xy of
weight s (gxy = s), if, for instance, |xι − yι| + |x − y| = s, that is if the Manhattan distance
between x and y is equal to s.
Other potential applications include conflicts between groups (Esteban and Ray, 1999, 2011),
private provision of public goods (Bramoulle´ and Kranton, 2007), research output and citation
networks (Leskovec et al., 2005), friendship networks (Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2009), and trust
networks (Richardson et al., 2003).
3 Results
To recall, our objective in this paper is two-fold. First, as demonstrated above, we propose
network theory as a unifying framework to study discrete polarization without any constraint
on dimensionality. Second, we present a theoretical foundation for a family of polarization
measures in this framework. For the latter, we closely follow the axiomatic approach in ER, who
envisage polarization as the aggregate antagonism in a population. The antagonism between
are studied in the social choice literature widely. There is also a growing interest in measuring polarization in
preference profiles, as in Can et al. (2015, 2017). Note that network (g′′,pi′′), could alternatively be defined using
a weighted metric as in Can (2014).
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individuals depend on how they identify themselves and how alienated they feel from others.
In the network setup we propose, individuals in a population are identified only with their
definitive attributes, which are represented as nodes in the network. As emphasized before,
these attributes are by no means restricted to singletons or a uni-dimensional space.
The effect of the feeling of identification of each individual on her antagonism towards
another is measured in relation to the presence of others that share the same attributes, hence are
in the same node. This effect is the basis of the intra-group homogeneity, and we denote it with
I(pii) for each individual i ∈ N . Thus, when the nodes represent individuals, each individual
feels the same level of identification, whereas when nodes represent groups of individuals, the
identification an individual feels is a function of how many others are in the same node (I(pii)).
The only assumption we make on the identification function I : R≥0 → R≥0 is that I(pii) > 0
whenever pii > 0, so that each individual that carries a relevant attribute has a positive level of
identification, regardless of if her attributes are unique to herself or not. This implies that two
groups (nodes) of the same size exhibit the same level of identification.23
The distance an individual perceives between herself and any other individual is a natu-
ral component of the antagonism between individuals as it forms the basis of the inter-group
heterogeneity. We measure this alienation component as a function of the distance between
individuals a(d(i, j)). We assume that the alienation function a : R≥0 → R≥0 is a continuous
and nondecreasing function with a(0) = 0.
Finally, the effective antagonism of group i towards group j is measured by a function
T (Ii, aij) of the identification of group i, Ii = I(pii), and the alienation between groups i and
j, aij = a(d(i, j)). As in ER, we consider polarization measures P : N → R≥0 that gives the
aggregate effective antagonism in a population:
P(g,pi) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
piipijT
(
I(pii), a
(
dg(i, j)
))
, (1)
where T : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 is a continuous and strictly increasing function with T (x, 0) = 0
for any x ∈ R≥0 and no additional condition is imposed on functions a and I. As we shall see,
our axioms will pin down specific functional forms for both functions.
Our goal is to follow the axiomatization in ER as close as possible, and modify it only when
the network setting requires. As it turns out, the first two axioms can be restated only with
slight changes in the nomenclature. Axiom 3, as we will see, needs an important adjustment.
Axiom 1
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0 ∀i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, y) ≤ dg(x, z).
Statement: Fix pix and dg(x, y). There exists  > 0 and µ = µ(pix, dg(x, y)) > 0 such that
dg(y, z) <  and piy < µpix imply that for any (g
′,pi′) ∈ N with n ≥ 2 nodes such that pi′x′ = pix,
pi′w′ = piy + piz, dg′(x
′w′) = 12 (dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)) and pi
′
i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, w′}, we have
P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi).
23While potentially restrictive, this is a standard assumption (see for instance Esteban and Ray, 1994, 2012).
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The Axiom 1 captures the situations where two small groups join while keeping the (average)
distance the same. Suppose in (g,pi) there is a node with large group and there are two other
smaller and equal-sized groups that are close to each other but further away from the larger
group. Then network (g′,pi′), in which smaller groups are joined at a node which is located
in g′ at a distance equal to their average distance (in g) to the large group, is more polarized.
Figure 3a below illustrates such moves.24 Note that the distance of the fourth node to smaller
nodes are not restricted in the axiom, allowing for moves such as the one depicted in Figure 3b.
pi2
pi3pi1
(a) The move shown by arrows
increase polarization.
pi2
pi3pi1
(b) Axiom 1 applies when the new node is further
away from the two small nodes as well.
Figure 3: Axiom 1.
Axiom 2
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > piz > 0, piy > 0, and pii = 0,∀i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, z) > dg(x, y) > dg(y, z).
Statement: There exists  > 0 such that for any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi
′
y′ , pi
′
z′) = (pix, piy, piz),
and pi′i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, y′, z′} such that dg(x, z) = dg′(x′, z′), 0 < dg′(x′, y′) − dg(x, y) =
dg(y, z)− dg′(y′, z′) <  we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi).
Axiom 2 applies when the group at one extreme is larger than the one at the other extreme
and a third group is closer to the smaller of these two. When the group in-between moves slightly
closer to the smaller group and away from the larger group, polarization increases.25 Note that
the relative size of the group in the middle is not restricted. Figure 4a below illustrates such a
move. Contrary to the real line, the middle group is not necessarily between the two extreme
groups.
pi1 pi32
pi3
(a) The move shown by the arrow in-
creases polarization.
pi32
pi3
pi1
(b) Axiom 2 applies in such a move as
well, which is not possible on the real line.
Figure 4: Axiom 2.
24Note that g and g′ do not have to be different and in our depictions, we present axioms on the same graphs.
25Axiom 2 is rather weak as it applies to only those (small) moves such that an increase in distance from one
extreme is equal to a decrease in the distance to the other extreme.
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Note that the described move makes the middle group closer to the smaller group, but its
new location does not have to be close to its original position, as seen in Figure 4b. This kind
of a move is not possible on the real line.
Axiom 3
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes such that pix > 0, piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0 ∀i ∈
N(g) \ {x, y, z}. Furthermore, dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d > 0.
Statement: For any ∆ ∈ (0, pix2 ] and any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi′y′ , pi′z′) = (pix − 2∆, piy +
∆, piz + ∆), and pi
′
i′ = 0, i
′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, y′, z′} such that dg′(x′, y′) = dg′(x′, z′) = d and
dg(y, z) = dg′(x
′, z′), we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi) whenever dg(y, z) = cd, for any c > 1.
Axiom 3 states that as long as the distance between two lateral groups is greater than
the distance between the “middle group” and a lateral group, a network in which individuals
from the group in the middle are reallocated to extreme points will exhibit higher polarization.
Note that the relative size of the group in node x is not restricted. Furthermore, dg(x, y) =
dg(x, z) = d implies, in a network, only that dg(y, z) ≤ 2d, whereas on the real line y 6= z and
|x− y| = |z− x| = d imply that |z− y| = 2d. We will come back to this crucial point in Section
4.
pi2
pi1
pi3
∆ ∆
Figure 5: Axiom 3 dictates that the dissolution of the middle group into two extreme nodes increases
polarization.
We are now ready to state our central result, which identifies the measures of polarization
in networks that satisfy Axioms 1–3.
Theorem 1
A polarization measure P of the family defined in (1) satisfies Axioms 1–3 and homotheticity
if and only if
P(g,pi) = K
∑
i∈N(g)
∑
j∈N(g)
pi2i pijdg(i, j), (2)
for some constant K > 0.
A few comments are in order. First, recall that ER characterize measures of polarization on
a real line as
PER(pi) = K
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
pi1+αi pij |i− j|, (3)
with K > 0 and α ∈ (0, α∗], with α∗ ' 1.6. The main difference between (2) and (3) is that the
index in (2) implies the unique value of α = 1. The reason for this difference lies in the nature
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of the distances, discussed in relation with Axiom 3. It requires that a move from a middle
mass (pix) to the lateral points (piy and piz) equidistant from the middle increases polarization
whenever they are individually further away from each other than they are to the midpoint.
Contrary to the real line, in (g,pi), dg(y, z) is not determined by dg(x, y) = dg(x, z), and in fact
it can very well happen that dg(y, z) < dg(x, y) even when dg(x, y) = dg(x, z). We revisit this
important matter in Section 4.2.1 below. Note that Axioms 1 and 2 also require adaptation for
the network setup, but these adaptations are minor and do not have important implications on
the form of the characterized family of measures.
Intuitively, a society is polarized if it can be grouped in a small number of very homogeneous
groups (with respect ot some attributes) of similar size that are very different with respect to
these attributes. And polarization is often conceptualized to capture the level of bipolarity
or bimodality.26 Thus, it is desirable that a polarization measure is maximized at a bipolar
distribution. A bipolar network is one where the population is split equally into two extreme
(most distant) nodes. The maximal distance between two nodes in graph g is called the diameter
of g and is denoted by d(g).27 For any graph g let piB(g) denote the distribution in which the
population is split equally across two nodes at distance d(g). Our next result shows that
(g, piB(g)) is more polarized than any other network (g,pi) under any measure P within our
characterization.
Proposition 1
P(g,piB(g)) >P(g,pi) for any (g,pi) with pi 6= piB(g) and any measure P as in (2).
4 Discussion
In this section, we first discuss some important properties of the measures we characterize in
relation to the structure of networks. Then we discuss how our work can be related to previous
papers in the literature. We conclude this section with a discussion on how weakening the
Axiom 3 can relate our characterization to the one in ER, by exactly describing the relationship
between the importance of identification (α) and the network structure.
4.1 Network structure and polarization
We first want to emphasize that the structure of a graph g determines the distance between any
two nodes in N(g). A change in the structure of a graph g, e.g., deleting a link, may affect the
measured levels of polarization, even if pi stays the same. Although empty nodes do not directly
contribute to the levels of polarization, they may be important “indirectly” if, for instance, they
are located on the shortest path between some non-empty nodes. Figure 6 illustrates this point.
26See Foster and Wolfson (2010) for a discussion on bipolarity of income distributions and DiMaggio et al.
(1996) for a more general discussion on bimodality, among others.
27More formally, d(g) = maxi,j∈N(g) dg(i, j). See Vega-Redondo (2007) or Jackson (2008).
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1
35
(a) (g,pi).
5
4
2
1
3
(b) (g′,pi).
15 4 2
(c) (g′′,pi′′).
Figure 6: Three networks where each link has weight 1 and each node except the node 3 has weight 1
(pi3 = 0). (g
′,pi) is obtained from (g,pi) by deleting the link g13. (g′′,pi′′) is obtained from (g,pi) by
deleting the node 3. Note that pii = pi
′′
i for all i ∈ N(g′′). We have P(g,pi) <P(g′,pi) =P(g′′,pi′′).
Next, we want to note that given Proposition 1, we have that d(g) > d(g′) impliesP(g,piB(g)) >
P(g′,piB(g′)). That is, comparing two bipolar networks, the larger the diameter, the higher
the polarization. Also, in the special case when pi = 1, P(g,pi) is proportional to the aver-
age shortest path in the graph g.28 Thus, the closer the individuals are, on average, the less
polarized the network is.
4.2 Relation to previous results
We argue that the settings considered in ER and MRQ are special cases of our setting, and
hence our results can be seen as generalizations of theirs. To start with, recall that ER consider
distributions on the real line with a finite support (p. 830). It is straightforward to note that
any distribution as such can be described as a network. To see this, let pi be a distribution with
a set of N mass points. Consider graph g with N nodes such that gij = |i − j| for any two
adjacent mass points i and j on the real line, and ij /∈ g otherwise. Graph g and distribution
pi define a network (g,pi) that is similar to the line network (g′′,pi′′) depicted in Figure 6c.29
Indeed, we can represent any distribution on an m−dimensional space with finite number of
mass point as a network by simply setting gij = ‖i− j‖, where ‖·‖ can be any norm.
MRQ, in their analysis of “discrete polarization”, consider the cases where the distance
between any two different groups equals to 1 — they refer to their measure as the polarisation
based on classifications. It is immediate to note that this setting can be described by the binary
network, i.e., (g,pi = 1) with the complete graph g such that gij = 1 for any pair of nodes
i, j ∈ N(g). MRQ delivers a characterization based on a different set of axioms.30
4.2.1 Axiom 3 and its role in the network setting
Axiom 3 requires that the described change in (g,pi) leads to an increase in polarization only
when the distance between lateral nodes is at least as large as the distance between the center
node and lateral nodes. We now contemplate on less demanding versions of Axiom 3, labeled
28The average shortest path in a network is closely related to the “closeness” measure of a network. See
Vega-Redondo (2007) or Jackson (2008) for a textbook treatment and Freeman (1978) for an earlier discussion.
29Clearly, this is not the unique way to represent a discrete distribution with n mass points as a network.
For instance, we could write gij = |i − j| for any two points i, j ∈ N , in which case g would be the complete
graph. However, any consistent representation that relies on the same metric will lead to a network with the
same polarization.
30The logical dependence between our axioms and the ones in MRQ is an interesting question that is left for
future research.
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systematically as Axiom 3(c), in which we require that the scenario in Axiom 3 leads to an
increase in polarization only if the lateral nodes are “far enough” (quantified by the scalar c)
from each other. This is of interest since some settings imply a specific network structure in
which there is a clear lower bound for the distance between two lateral nodes contemplated
in Axiom 3. For instance, as we saw before, any discrete distribution on a real line can be
represented with a line network. On any line network, the distance between lateral masses is
exactly the double of the distance between the middle mass and a lateral mass, as it is on the
real line.
Axiom 3(c)
Data: Network (g,pi) with n ≥ 3 nodes, pix > piy = piz > 0 and pii = 0 for all i ∈ N(g)\{x, y, z}.
Furthermore, dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d > 0.
Statement: Fix c ∈ (1, 2]. For any  ∈ (0, pix] and any network (g′,pi′) with (pi′x′ , pi′y′ , pi′z′) =
(pix− , piy + 2 , piz + 2), and pi′i′ = 0, i′ ∈ N(g′) \ {x′, y′, z′} such that dg′(x′, y′) = dg′(x′, z′) = d
and dg(y, z) = dg′(y
′, z′), we have P(g′,pi′) >P(g,pi) whenever dg(y, z) ≥ dc.
c¯d
pi2
pi1
pi3
∆ ∆
dd
Figure 7: Axiom 3(c) dictates that the move shown by the arrows should increase polarization if c ≤ c¯.
When c = 1, we have the same statement as in Axiom 3, while for c = 2 we have essentially
the Axiom 3 in ER. The particular value of c has important implications on the resulting
measure of polarization. We have the following generalization of the characterization, which
exactly describes the implications of the flexibility the Axiom 3(c) entails compared to Axiom
3.
Theorem 2
Fix c ∈ (1, 2]. There exists an interval [α(c), α¯(c)] ⊆ (0, α∗] with α∗ ' 1.6 such that the polariza-
tion measure P of the family defined in (1) satisfies Axioms 1, 2, and 3(c) and homotheticity
if and only if
Pα(g,pi) = K
∑
i∈N(g)
∑
j∈N(g)
pi1+αi pijdg(i, j) (4)
for some constant K > 0 whenever α ∈ [α(c), α¯(c)]. Furthermore, c2 > c1 =⇒ [α(c1), α¯(c1)] ⊂
[α(c2), α¯(c2)].
Theorem 2 shows that as we make Axiom 3 less demanding, the range of values of parameter
α for which our axioms is satisfied increases in a monotonic way. In particular, if we restrict
ourselves to line networks, then the network structure implies any move described in Axiom 3
is consistent with Axiom 3(c) for c = 2, and Axioms 1, 2 and 3(c) can be seen as restatements
of the Axioms 1–3 in ER.
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Finally, it should be noted that the claim in Proposition 1 holds for measures characterized
in Theorem 2 only if α = 1, i.e., for those measures characterized in Theorem 1. To see this,
take any network (g,pi) such that N(g) = {x, y, z} with 0 < gxy = gxz ≤ gyz. Then for any α ∈
R≥0 \ {1}, there exists a distribution pi 6= piB(g) and  > 0 such that P(g,pi) >Pα(g,piB(g))
whenever gyz = gxz + . This is a direct consequence of the fact that α 6= 1 only if Pα does not
satisfy Axiom 3.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a model of polarization in networks. This model can be used to study the
levels and trends of polarization in a wide range of applications. In Section 2, we discussed
several examples from political processes in parliaments and public preferences. The potential
of our proposal is by no means restricted to these examples. To name a few, Bail (2016)
constructs weighted networks between advocacy organizations based on the frequency of words
in the shared vocabulary of their posts. Stewart et al. (2018) construct retweet networks to
study the impact of suspicious troll activity on the levels of polarization on Twitter (see, also,
Conover et al., 2011). Farrell (2016) constructs a network of organizations based on the activities
of affiliates to study polarization on climate change issues among organizations. O’Connor and
Weatherall (2018) propose the network formalism to study polarization in scientific communities
around beliefs based on scientific knowledge. DiFonzo et al. (2013) employ a network-based
approach on capturing polarization of rumor beliefs in the context of social impact theory.
Reconstructing the axiomatic analysis of Esteban and Ray (1994), we characterize a family of
measures for the network setting that we propose. Importing the said axiomatic approach needs
a careful attention due to the distinct nature of the geodesic distance on networks compared
to the Euclidean distance on the real line. Our characterization result shows that the class of
measures characterized by ER carries almost intact to the networks. The only bite is in the
value of the parameter for the effect of identification on effective antagonism. We find that
α = 1 is a necessary and sufficient condition for the measures of polarization in the form of
aggregate antagonisms to satisfy the aforementioned axioms, together with hometheticity. We
demonstrate that polarization is maximized when the population is allocated on the two most
distant nodes in the network. Finally, we discuss how restricting to specific class of network
structures may expand the class of polarization measures.
Our model can be further developed along different dimensions. One promising avenue for
future research pertains to extending the measures so as to capture the intra-group hetero-
geneity, which could also be described as a network. In that case, the identification function
should additionally depend on the within-group structure, which can be captured in different
ways. Another direction for future research relates to the fact that the current axiomatization
is independent from the identification-alienation framework. That is to say that there may be
measures with a different functional form that satisfy the same set of axioms for networks. An
immediate question is the existence of interesting characterizations as such.
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Appendix: Proofs
First, let us define the function f : R2≥0 × [1, 2]→ R such that:
f(z, α, c) = (1 + α)
[
z − z
α
2
+
z1+α
2
(2− c(2 + α))
1 + α
]
− 1
2
. (5)
Function f(·) will play an important role in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 related to impli-
cations of Axiom 3 and Axiom 3(c). In the special case when c = 2, f becomes identical to
the function defined in equation (2) in ER. Lemma 1 considers the special cases when c = 1 or
α = 1 and is used in the proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, which are stated and
proved after the proof of Theorem 1, are used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 1
The following properties hold.
(i) maxz≥0 f(z, α, 1) > 0 for any α > 0 with α 6= 1.
(ii) f(z, 1, c) < 0, for all c ∈ (1, 2].
(iii) f(z, 1, 1) < 0 for all z 6= 1 and f(1, 1, 1) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) First, note that f(1, α, 1) = 0. Furthermore, function f(z, α, 1) is increasing in z at z = 1
when α < 1 and decreasing in z at z = 1 when α > 1. This implies, since f is continuous
in z, that there exists 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 such that f(1 + 1, α, 1) > 0 when α < 1, and
f(1− 2, α, 1) > 0 when α > 1, therefore it must be that maxz≥0 f(z, α, 1) > 0 whenever
α 6= 1.
(ii) We have that f(z, 1, c) = −12 + z + (1 − 3c2 )z2. Solving this quadratic equation, one can
verify that c > 1 implies f(z, 1, c) < 0 for all z ≥ 0.
(iii) f(z, 1, 1) = −(1/2)(−1 + z)2, which is negative, except at point z = 1, when it takes value
0.
Proof of Theorem 1. We assume K = 1, without loss of generality for the “only if” part. In the
proof we show that Axiom 1 and Axiom 2 are satisfied for Pα defined in equation (4) and not
just P from equation (2). We do this since establishing this claim is important for the proof of
Theorem 2, where we just refer to the arguments developed here when discussing Axiom 1 and 2.
Sufficiency.
Axiom 1. Let pix = p, piy = piz = q. We have:
Pα(g,pi) = p
1+αqdg(x, y) + p
1+αqdg(x, z) + 2q
1+αqdg(y, z) + q
1+αpdg(x, y) + q
1+αpdg(x, z),
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while
Pα(g
′,pi′) =p1+α(2q)dg′(x′, w′) + (2q)1+αpdg′(x′, w′)
=p1+α(2q)
dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)
2
+ (2q)1+αp
dg(x, y) + dg(x, z)
2
After simplification we get:
Pα(g,pi) = (dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))(p
1+αq + q1+αp) + 2q2+αdg(y, z),
Pα(g
′,pi′) = (dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))(p1+αq + q1+αp) + (2α − 1)(dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))q1+αp,
which impliesPα(g,pi) >Pα(g′,pi′) whenever (2α−1)(dg(x, y)+dg(x, z))q1+αp > 2q2+αdg(y, z)
or, equivalently,
(2α − 1)(dg(x, y) + dg(x, z))p > 2qdg(y, z). (6)
It is easy to see that whenever d(y, z) is small enough (d(y, z) < ) inequality (6) will hold for
any α > 0 whenever q is small enough relative to p (q < µp, with µ > 0).
Axiom 2. Let pix = p, piy = q, and piz = r. For network (g,pi) we have:
Pα(g,pi) = p
1+α[dg(x, y)q+dg(x, z)r]+q
1+α[dg(x, y)p+dg(y, z)r]+r
1+α[dg(x, z)p+dg(y, z)q].
For network (g′,pi′) the polarization index takes form:
Pα(g
′,pi′) =p1+α[dg′(x′, y′)q + dg′(x′, z′)r] + q1+α[dg′(x′, y′)pdg′(y′, z′)r]
+r1+α[dg′(x
′, z′)p+ dg′(y′, z′)q].
Subtracting and using that dg(x, z) = dg′(x
′, z′), we get:
Pα(g,pi)−Pα(g′,pi′) = q1+α[p(dg′(x′, y′)− dg(x, y)) + r(dg′(z′, y′)− dg(y, z))]
+ q[p1+α(dg′(x
′, y′)− dg(x, y)) + r1+α(dg′(z′, y′)− dg(y, z))]
which is positive for any α > 0 whenever r < p, since dg′(x
′, y′)−dg(x, y) = dg′(z′, y′)−dg(y, z).
Axiom 3. Let dg(x, y) = dg(x, z) = d, and let dg(y, z) = cd with c > 1. Furthermore, let
pix = p+2∆ and piy = piz = q−∆. The polarization of network (g,pi) as a function of ∆ ∈ (0, p2 ],
can be written as:
Pα((g,pi); ∆) = 2cd
(
(q −∆)2+α)+ 2d((p+ 2∆)(q −∆)((p+ 2∆)α(q −∆)α)). (7)
To prove that P satisfies Axiom 3 we need to show that ∂Pα((g,pi),∆)∂∆
∣∣∣
∆=0
< 0 for every
(p, q) 0 as described. Differentiating (7) at ∆ = 0 and dividing by 2d (≥ 0) we get:
∂Pα
∂∆
∣∣∣∣
∆=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ −pα(p− 2(1 + α)q)+ qα(− (1 + α)p+ 2q − (2 + α)cq) < 0. (8)
Dividing by p1+α and replacing with z = q/p, we get:
∂Pα
∂∆
∣∣∣∣
∆=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ −(1− 2(1 + α)z)+ zα(− (1 + α) + 2z − (2 + α)cz) < 0, (9)
⇐⇒ (1 + α)
[
z − z
α
2
+
z1+α
2
(
2− c(2 + α))
1 + α
]
− 1
2
< 0, (10)
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which is equivalent to f(z, α, c) < 0. The claim follows from Lemma 1.
Necessity.
The proof follows the proof of Theorem 1 in ER. As Axioms 1–2 are essentially the same as the
corresponding axioms in ER, the proof technique applies in our case too. We describe the proof
briefly below, and refer the reader to ER for detailed derivation.
Axioms 1–2 imply that function T from (1) is linear in its second argument, that is, function
θ(pi, δ) ≡ T (I(pi), a(dg(i, j))) can be written as θ(pi, δ) = φ(pi)δ. Furthermore, Axiom 1 implies
that φ(·) is an increasing function.31 Then, homotheticity implies that φ(p) = Kpα for some
constants (K, p) 0. Lemma 1 together with Axiom 3 imply that α = 1.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 2, which follows Lemmas 2–3 below. In what follows,
we denote the maximal value of parameter α in ER with α∗ (so that α∗ ' 1.6).
Lemma 2
Let 1 < α < α∗ and c ∈ [1, 2]. There exists α¯ = α¯(c) ∈ [1, α∗] such that maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) ≤ 0
whenever α ≤ α¯. Furthermore, α¯ is increasing in c.
Proof of Lemma 2. For α ≥ 1, f is concave in z. Thus, the maximum of f is given by the first
order condition:
1
2
(1 + α)
(
2− αzα−1 + (2− (2 + α)c)zα) = 0. (11)
Taking derivative of the value function v(α, c) = maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) with respect to c, and apply-
ing the envelope theorem, we get:
∂v
∂c
=
∂f
∂z
∂z
∂c
+
∂f
∂c
=
∂f
∂c
= −1
2
(α+ 2)zα+1 < 0.
That is the value function is (strictly) decreasing with c. This means that v(α, c) > v(α, 2), for
any c ∈ [1, 2).
Lemma 1 implies that for any c > 1 we have that f(z, 1, c) < 0. Thus, for c > 1 it must
be v(1, c) < 0. Since f(z, 2, 2) > 0, as pointed out in ER (p. 833) and v(α, c) is decreasing in
c, it must be that v(2, c) > 0 for any c ∈ [1, 2]. Thus function v(α, c) has the property that
v(1, c) < 0 and v(2, c) > 0 for any c ∈ [1, 2]. To show that there exist α¯(c) from the claim of
the Lemma, we show that v(α, c) is increasing in α. Indeed:
∂v
∂α
=
∂f
∂z
∂z
∂α
+
∂f
∂α
=
∂f
∂α
=
1
2
(2z − zα(1 + cz + (1 + α+ (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z)).
To see that the above derivative is positive, first note that the first order condition (11)
implies that at the maximum of function f the following holds:
zα−1 =
2
α− z(2− (2 + α)c) . (12)
From the above equality, together with the fact that α − 1 > 0 and c ≥ 0 implies that z < 1.
Indeed, if z > 1 then the RHS of (12) would be greater than 1, while the LHS of (12) would
31See Kawada et al. (2018) for a solution to a technical problem arising from the original formulation of Axiom
1 in ER.
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be smaller than 1, since the denominator α − z(2 − (2 + α)c) would be greater than 2 since
(2 + α)c > 3 and z > 1. Plugging (12) into the expression for ∂v∂α from above. we get:
∂v
∂α
=
1
2
(2z − zα(1 + cz + (1 + α+ (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z))
=
1
2
(2z − 2
α− z(2− (2 + α)c)(1 + cz + (1 + α+ (−2 + (2 + α)c)z) ln z))
= −z (1− α) + (2− 3c− 2αc)z + [1 + 2α+ (−2 + 2c+ αc)z] log z
α− z(2− (2 + α)c) ,
which is clearly positive for z < 1, α ≥ 1 and c > 1.
Therefore, the intermediate value theorem implies that, for any c ∈ [1, 2] there exist α¯(c) ∈
[1, 2] such that maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) ≤ 0 for whenever α ≤ α¯(c) (with equality only when α = α¯).
Finally, ∂v∂c < 0 and
∂v
∂α > 0 imply that α¯(c) increases with c for c ∈ [1, 2].
Lemma 3
Let 0 ≤ α < 1 and c ∈ [1, 2]. There exists α = α(c) ∈ [0, 1] such that maxz≥0 f(α, z, c) ≥ 0
whenever α ≤ α(c). Furthermore, α is decreasing in c.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let α < 1. We first prove that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 only if z ≥ 1. Then we show
that for z ≥ 1 f is decreasing in α. Therefore, whenever f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 we have that f decreases
with α, and consequently v(α, c) = maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) is decreasing in α.
To show that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 ⇒ z ≥ 1 we first note that f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 ⇒ f(z, α, 1) ≥ 0
since f is decreasing in c. Hence, to show f(z, α, c) ≥ 0 ⇒ z ≥ 1 it is sufficient to show that
f(z, α, 1) ≥ 0 ⇒ z ≥ 1. To prove this implication, we show that z < 1 ⇒ f(z, α, 1) < 0. We
have
f(z, α, 1) =
1
2
(−1 + 2(1 + α)z − (1 + α)zα − αz1+α)
=− 1 + (1 + α)(2z − zα)− αz1+α
<− 1 + (1 + α)(2z − z)− αz1+α
=− 1 + (1 + α)z − αz1+α
<− 1 + (1 + α)z − αz2
=(1− αz)(z − 1)
<0,
where the inequalities follow the fact that α, z < 1.
Next we prove that if z ≥ 1, then f is decreasing in α. We have that:
∂f
∂α
=
1
2
[
2z − zα − czα+1 − zα (1 + α+ 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z]
We need to show that 2z − zα − czα+1 − zα (1 + α+ 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z ≤ 0. Dividing by
z, we obtain the inequality
2z1−α ≤ 1 + cz + (1 + α+ 2(c− 1)z + αcz) ln z,
which holds as the LHS is not greater than 2, because z ≥ 1 and α− 1 < 0 and the RHS is not
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smaller than 2, because c ≥ 1 and z ≥ 1.
Therefore, whenever f(z, α, c) ≥ 0, f is decreasing in α. This implies that v(α, c) =
maxz≥0 f(z, α, c) is decreasing in α whenever v(α, c) ≥ 0. We choose α(c) to be equal to a
zero of function v(α, c), whenever this zero exists on [0, 1), and equal to 0 otherwise. Since v is
decreasing in c, and decreasing in α whenever v(α, c) ≥ 0 we have that α(c) decreases when c
increases.
Proof of Theorem 2. Follows from the proof of Theorem 1 (claims related to Axioms 1–2 ), and
Lemmas 2–3.
We now turn to the proof of Proposition 1. We first state and prove Lemma 4, which will
be used in the proof of Proposition 1.
Lemma 4
For any network (g,pi) such that pi has at lest 4 nonzero mass points, there exists a 3 node
network (g∗,pi∗) such that g∗ij = d(g) for i, j ∈ N(g∗), with
∑3
i=1 pi
∗
i =
∑
i∈Ng pii such that:
P(g,pi) <P(g∗,pi∗).
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof is constructive. Assume, without loss of generality, that in (g,pi),
we have pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ · · · ≥ pin with pik > 0 and pik+1 = 0 for some k ≥ 4. Taking K = 1 in (2),
P(g,pi) =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
pi2i pijdg(i, j)
≤ d(g)
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1,j 6=i
pi2i pij
= d(g)
k−2∑
i=1
k−2∑
j=1
j 6=i
pi2i pij + pi
2
k−1
k∑
j=1
j 6=k−1
pij + pi
2
k
k∑
j=1
j 6=k
pij + pik−1
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j + pik
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j
 .
(13)
Denote the last expression in (13) with P(g′,pi′), where g′ij = d(g) for all i, j ∈ N(g) and
pi′i = pii for all i ∈ N(g). Consider now a change in (g′,pi′) such that masses in nodes k and
k − 1 are joined together to obtain (g′′,pi′′). We have
P(g′′,pi′′) = d(g)
k−2∑
i=1
k−2∑
j=1
j 6=i
pi2i pij + (pik−1 + pik)
2
k−2∑
j=1
pij + (pik−1 + pik)
k−2∑
j=1
pi2j
 .
Subtracting P(g′,pi′) we get:
P(g′′,pi′′)−P(g′,pi′) = d(g)
2pik−1pik k−2∑
j=1
pij − pi2k−1pik − pik−1pi2k
 (14)
= d(g)pik−1pik
2 k−2∑
j=1
pij − (pik−1 + pik)
 > 0, (15)
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where the last inequality follows from the choice of k and k − 1 and the fact that k ≥ 4. From
(13) and (15), it follows that for any network (g,pi) as such we have P(g,pi) <P(g′′,pi′′).
If k = 4, (g′′,pi′′) is such that |N(g′′)| = 3 with g′′ij = d(g) for any i, j ∈ N(g′′) and pi′′1 = pi1,
pi′′2 = pi2 and pi′′3 = pi3 + pi4, which completes the proof. If k > 4, the same procedure of joining
the masses in nodes k − 1 and k − 2 can be iteratively applied.
Proof of Proposition 1. First, note that for any network (g,pi) with |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| = 2
and pii 6= pij for i, j ∈ N(g), P(g,piB(g)) = Kgij2
(
pii+pij
2
)3
> Kgij
(
piipij(pii + pij)
)
=P(g,pi).
Next, take any (g,pi) such that |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| ≥ 4. By Lemma 4, we can construct
(g′′,pi′′) such that |N(g′′)| = 3 with g′′ij = d(g) for any i, j ∈ N(g′′). Pick i ∈ N(g′′) such that
pii ≥ pil for all l ∈ N(g′′) and join the masses in nodes j, k ∈ N(g′′) \ {i} to obtain the network
(g∗,pi∗). Taking K = 1, we have P(g∗,pi∗) = d(g)
[
pi2i (pij + pik) + (pij + pik)
2pii
]
, whereas
P(g′′,pi′′) = d(g)
[
pi2i (pij + pik) + pi
2
j (pii + pik) + pi
2
k(pii + pij)
]
. We have P(g∗,pi∗) ≥P(g′′,pi′′)
iff 2pii ≥ pij + pik, which holds as pii ≥ pil,∀l ∈ N(g). As we noted above P(g∗,piB(g∗)) >
P(g∗,pi∗).
Finally, take any (g,pi) such that |{i ∈ N(g) : pii > 0}| = 3. We can construct (g′,pi′) as
in (13), by replacing gij for all i, j ∈ N(g) with d(g), so that P(g′,pi′) ≥P(g,pi). The proof
follows from Lemma 4 and the previous paragraph.
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